United States President Donald Trump has signalled that Washington is in no hurry to end its war with Iran.
“We don’t need a deal with Iran,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform late last week. “Those days have long since passed. We’ve got their money, Hundreds of Billions of Dollars, and we’ve got their Strait!”, referring to the Strait of Hormuz, which joins the Gulf to the open ocean.
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In the same post, Trump told Vice President JD Vance to give his “complete and total attention” to what Trump described as “corruption and crime” in Democratic-run cities. Vance led the talks with Iran, which produced a short-lived truce in June.
But Trump has given mixed signals in recent days.
Earlier last week, he said the war was “militarily … effectively over”, though he added that he “would not hesitate” to resume strikes if diplomacy failed.
Trump’s mixed messaging came as his Republican Party suffered heavy losses in the November 3 midterm elections, which Vance blamed on the deeply unpopular US-Israel war on Iran and its economic fallout, in particular soaring fuel prices.
Here’s what we know about where this war may be heading now and what history tells us about where frozen wars end.
What do both sides want now?
Observers say Trump’s mixed messages – and Vance’s comments criticising the war – indicate a disagreement within the party, with at least some members of the administration more comfortable with leaving the conflict unresolved.
That could mean leaving the US naval blockade of Iranian ports in place and sanctions against Iran ongoing – both red lines for Iran, which has consistently stated that it will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz or resume peace talks until these are lifted, among other demands.
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On November 9, President Masoud Pezeshkian said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had ordered officials to end the state of “neither war nor peace”.
Pezeshkian added that Iran was ready to negotiate but would not yield to coercion. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator, told Al Jazeera that “the ball is now in the American court” – to accept its terms for talks or continue the war.
What is a frozen conflict?
The term has no strict legal definition. It generally describes a conflict in which large-scale fighting has stopped or sharply declined, but no peace agreement or political settlement has been reached. The issues which caused the war remain unresolved.
The front lines or the balance of control then harden into a de facto reality – in this case, with the US blockading Iranian ports and Iran targeting ships in the Strait of Hormuz that it says have not been authorised to pass, or firing missiles at US assets in neighbouring countries.
Both sides keep their forces in place, often separated by a ceasefire line or a buffer zone. They may agree to an armistice or a series of truces without formally ending hostilities, such as the memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June, which fell apart within weeks.
The phrase “frozen war” became common in the 1990s and 2000s as a way to describe conflicts in the former Soviet Union. These included conflicts in Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
A frozen conflict is not necessarily a peaceful one. Skirmishes, blockades, economic warfare and periodic flare-ups are common. The defining feature is that neither side can impose a decisive outcome, and neither is willing to make the concessions a lasting peace would require.
Could the US-Israel war on Iran become a ‘frozen war’?
The war began in February, when the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran. Talks in Pakistan in April produced a memorandum of understanding in June which paused the fighting and briefly lifted the US blockade. The truce collapsed soon after – primarily over disagreements about control of the Strait of Hormuz – and Washington reimposed its naval blockade on July 14.
“Diplomatically, we are already there and have been since July, when the June memorandum fell apart,” said Muhanad Seloom, an assistant professor in critical security studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. However, he added that the word “frozen” “flatters” a conflict with a US blockade, attacks on shipping around Hormuz running at more than one a day and strikes in both directions.
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The US has carried out limited strikes, including on Iranian air defence systems on Qeshm Island. Iran has attacked tankers using what it calls unauthorised routes in the Strait of Hormuz. According to trade intelligence firm Kpler, only five commodity vessels crossed the strait on November 7, and none crossed the following day, despite US claims to be escorting ships through.
“The war has changed form, from an air campaign to a siege,” Seloom told Al Jazeera, “and sieges end when the besieged side either breaks or breaks out”.
What are Washington’s options?
For Trump, a serious escalation carries heavy political risk right now.
In October, a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that nearly 70 percent of Americans believed the war was not worth fighting. Polls have also consistently suggested deep opposition to sending troops to Iran.
Following the crushing defeat in the midterms, which resulted in the Republicans losing control of the US Congress to the Democratic Party, Vance wrote on X that anyone who believed the war was worth “losing the Senate for the next 6 years” should argue so openly.
“With support for the war at 31 percent and Congress just lost, a ground operation is close to unsellable,” Seloom said.
Yet ending the war on current terms is also unattractive for the US.
Lifting the naval blockade on Iranian ports – a move designed to stop oil exports, further crippling Iran’s economy – and leaving the Strait of Hormuz under contested Iranian control would leave Trump with nothing to show for eight months of war. It would arguably be a worse position given that the strait was freely open to all shipping up until the war began.
According to reporting by The Associated Press news agency, Trump has conceded that walking away with Iran’s current government in place would amount to a “defeat”.
“Ironically, there is no military solution that does not involve a ground component,” said Tallha Abdulrazaq, a researcher at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute. Trump is reluctant to commit ground forces, and the public is “wary of another Iraq or Afghanistan”. As a result, Abdulrazaq said, “this conflict will drag on as neither side is willing to back down on their negotiating positions”.
Abdulrazaq said Trump wants a deal that goes far beyond the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran negotiated under President Barack Obama, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under that, Iran committed to restrictions on uranium enrichment and submitted to regular inspections.
But Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA during his first term. “He simply has no political wiggle room to accept a deal similar to it, and the Iranians are in no mood to even give him those terms,” Abdulrazaq said.
That leaves Trump “stuck between a rock and a hard place”, he said. The US president must either try to win the war decisively or accept lesser terms. Otherwise, the conflict will “stay frozen with the odd bit of tit-for-tat retaliation from either side”.
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Abdulrazaq added that any serious US-initiated escalation of the war would most likely come within the next two months – before the US Congress formally comes under Democratic control.
Until January, Republicans hold slim majorities in the outgoing Congress. That gives Trump “a narrow window of opportunity”, Abdulrazaq said, particularly with three US carrier strike groups likely to remain in the region through December.
Outside that window, Abdulrazaq said, the White House would prefer “no war, no peace”. In his view, Washington believes “correctly” that the US can absorb more economic pain than Iran.
But the Doha Institute’s Seloom warned that the siege in and around the Strait of Hormuz will hold only while it remains without too much cost. “American deaths, a Hormuz shock that lifts fuel prices again, or intelligence that Tehran is moving its 440kg of highly enriched uranium would each end it,” he said.
What are Tehran’s calculations now?
Iran is in its own bind. It has set seven conditions for a formal ceasefire, the reopening of the strait and a resumption of peace talks. These include lifting the US naval blockade, sanctions relief, the release of frozen funds and an end to hostilities on all fronts, including by Israel in Lebanon and hostilities against Iran’s allies in Yemen and Iraq. Ghalibaf has said while the Strait of Hormuz could also then be reopened, it will “never return” to its pre-war, toll-free status.
But the Iranian economy is under severe strain as a result of the naval blockade, decades of sanctions and a renewed economic push by the US against countries and entities trading with it since the war began.
Iran’s official statistics agency has reported that the economy shrank by 10.1 percent year-on-year between March and June. The central bank put annual inflation at 83.8 percent in September, and the rial has repeatedly hit record lows.
“Tehran’s primary non-kinetic option is engaging in diplomacy through regional mediators like Qatar,” Abdulrazaq said. “But Iran isn’t willing to cut a deal on the US’s terms, so the economic pressure will create ever-increasing desperate circumstances for the regime to contend with.”
Iran is “attempting to weather the storm of US sanctions by deepening its reliance on Chinese oil purchases, but this is being hindered by the naval blockade”, he added.
“Tehran’s only good move is a deniable one, worked through security channels,” Seloom said. “The Qatari formula would put inspectors back into the bombed sites as the blockade comes off.”
“The alternative is the ‘Sadat option’, a limited war to force negotiations, which is how Egypt broke its own ‘no war, no peace’ stalemate in 1973,” he said. “Ghalibaf’s talk of ‘sustainable deterrence’ suggests some in Tehran are tempted.”
Abdulrazaq said, “The enemy always gets a vote … Iran may decide to unilaterally escalate to break the US naval blockade and sanctions by causing global economic pain by attacking the Gulf Arab energy producers of the region”, adding, “piling international and domestic political pressure on the Trump administration to back off and cut a deal favourable to Iran”.
Previous frozen conflicts suggest that such stalemates can last for decades.
One example is the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War ended with an armistice in July 1953, but no peace treaty followed. More than 70 years later, the two Koreas remain technically at war, divided by a heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone.
Eastern Ukraine is a more recent and less stable example. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, fighting broke out in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists. The Minsk agreements brought ceasefires but no settlement. For nearly eight years, the front line barely moved, though shelling continued. That freeze ended in February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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Nagorno-Karabakh shows how a frozen conflict can thaw when the balance of power shifts. A 1994 ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan held for a quarter of a century. Then a stronger Azerbaijan reignited the war in 2020, and in 2023 it retook the disputed territory entirely.
Analysts, however, argue that territorial stalemates such as the Koreas and Russia-Ukraine are a poor fit for the US-Israel war on Iran.
Seloom said the closer parallel would be Iraq between 1991 and 2003 – “a regime that survived a war and then 12 years of embargo and periodic strikes, four of them without inspectors”.
Abdulrazaq points instead to Iran’s history: the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, when each side tried to cripple the other’s oil exports. The resulting “Tanker War” was defined by attacks on shipping and missile strikes on energy facilities, a campaign of economic attrition.
How would a frozen war on Iran be different?
Most frozen conflicts revolve around disputed territory and a fixed line of contact. The US-Iran confrontation runs through international shipping lanes, sanctions regimes and energy markets.
Seloom said the Iraq comparison breaks down at Hormuz. “Saddam’s containment sat on Iraqi territory, while this one sits on a waterway that carried about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas before the war,” he said, referring to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
That makes a stable freeze harder to sustain. Every tanker attack risks a wider escalation. A frozen war here could look less like the Koreas’ quiet Demilitarized Zone and more like Ukraine’s Donbas before 2022.
Abdulrazaq said the global economy cannot indefinitely absorb a frozen conflict over such a vital chokepoint, and diversifying trade routes takes time and money. Both sides, he said, are “on the clock” economically, in a way that South Korea and North Korea, as well as Ukraine and Russia, have never been.
Gulf states, shippers and energy importers are all exposed, which gives mediators such as Qatar and Pakistan a strong interest in breaking the deadlock. For now, both Washington and Tehran insist time is on their side. But history suggests that frozen conflicts often outlast the leaders who allowed them to freeze.
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